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A Live Digital Forensic system for Windows Networks

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Contributions

- **Usage of System Call interception for Computer Forensic purposes**
- Real Time System Call interception leads to *Live Digital Forensic* (LDF)
- Distributed collection of intercepted system call
- *System Call Interposition* technique on Windows NT family OS: many technical challenges
- The prototype (FOXP) is released as an open source project

Agenda

1. **Computer Forensic & Live Digital Forensic**
2. **What's FOXP?**
3. **FOXP Details**
4. **FOXP is FOSS**
5. **Future Works**

Computer Forensic & Live Digital Forensic

"While the former approach is a static analysis of electronic support only after a damaging event, the latter is able to represent the state of a live system for a determined time interval"

Requirements for a Computer Forensic system

- **Completeness**: system has to collect enough information to intercept the user's activity;
- **Integrity**: nobody can modify the log without being properly authorized;
- **Authenticity**: logs have to be authenticated;
- **Non bypassable**: nobody can escape the log activity or stop the logging without authorization;
- **Transparency:** logging has to be invisible to the user;
- **Reproducibility**: knowing for every activity "who" and "what";
- **Efficiency**: minimizing the log dimension and the node overhead.

Requirements for a Live Digital Forensic system

LDF has other requirements related to the "Live" term:

- **Continuity:** shutting down a system could represent a big problem in environments that cannot be stopped;
- **Real Time**: LDF intercepts activities **while the system is running** and no one knows about it; It can allow the CF expert and the Admin **to analyze in RT what happens** and to prevent malicious activities;
- **Proactivity**: In the classic Computer Forensic the approach is only "Reactive" whereas in the LDF it is "**Proactive**".

What's FOXP?

A LDF implementation: FOXP

FOXP (computer FOrensic eXPerience) : an open source Computer Forensic system for Windows network where every node has a Windows NT family OS (a closed OS that introduces a critical level of complexity)



Scenario:

- N controlled nodes, every node sends its logs to the central server
- A server node receives node logs and organizes them into a R-DBMS
- R-DBMS for data collection: is a support for a better forensic analysis

"Centralized logs collected in the collector node, allow to detect coordinated-attacks on network nodes: attacks that would not be detectable with a single node analysis"

FOXP Architecture

Client Side: logger component to collect data to send to the central server (Windows NT family OS)

Secure Communication: to provide authenticity, integrity and confidentiality (out of the scope of the paper)

Server Side: it's a server application that collects data sent from various clients; this data is available for forensic analysis



FOXP Architecture: client side

- **FOXP Agent (FOXP-A):** It is like an IDS that executes basic analysis of node activities (all the agents realize a Distributed IDS). If an anomaly is detected, than the logging is activated;
- **FOXP Logger (FOXP-L):** it intercepts the system calls invoked on the node and keeps track of them in a logging file;
- **FOXP Mgmt Service (FOXP-MS):** it manages the Agent and the Logger on every node as well as their communications with the centralized server of the architecture:
  - It receives commands from the Mgmt Console for the Agent rules update;
  - It forwards commands directly to the Logger;
  - It sends node live state to the Audit Server;
  - It receives messages from the Agent and send commands to the Logger;
  - It sends to the Collector Server the data collected from the Logger.



FOXP Architecture : server side

- **FOXP Collector Server (FOXP-CS):** it receives and stores logs from every network node;
- **FOXP Audit Server (FOXP-AS):** it receives and stores the state of the nodes. It receives commands from the FOXP-MC and forwards them to the FOXP-MS of the destination nodes;
- **FOXP Management Console (FOXP-MC):** it remotely manages network nodes communicating with the FOXP-MS on every node. It monitors the state of the nodes, configures and updates the Agent rules, manages the FOXP-Logger;
- **FOXP Forensic Analysis Tools (FOXP-FAT):** it executes the analysis of the collected logs and states.



FOXP Overview



FOXP Details

FOXP Logger

- It is a **kernel device driver** that uses the **system call interposition** technique;
- This technique substitutes for original pointers into the SSDT with new pointers to new system calls (**wrapper functions**);



- Interception technique extended to all the **284 system calls of Windows XP**
- It uses the system call index instead of its explicit name

System Call Interposition

- System Call Interposition technique explained:



FOXP Logger code

- Macro to exchange pointers in SSDT:

```
#define HOOK(APIName, NewAPIPtr, OldAPIPtr)
OldAPIPtr=ExchangePointers(&SSDT[Index(APIName)],NewAPIPtr)
…
HOOK( ZwOpenFile , NewZwOpenFile , OldZwOpenFile );
```

- Example of a new native API: NewZwOpenFile:

```
NewZwOpenFile(OUT PHANDLE phFile,…,IN ULONG OpenMode)
{
    doLog("ZwOpenFile", phFile,…, OpenMode);
    OldZwOpenFile(phFile,…,OpenMode );
}
```

Test: FOXP and Remote code exec

- Internet Explorer Remote Code Execution Exploit v 0.1



```
<input type="checkbox" id='a'>
<script>
        -- codice malizioso --
        var r = document.getElementById('a').createTextRange();
</script>
```

NtOpenFile
(
OUT PHANDLE phFile:34c|IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess:1000a1|
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes:/??/C:/WINDOWS/system32/cmd.exe|
OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK pIoStatusBlock:0|IN ULONG ShareMode:5|
IN ULONG OpenMode:60
) *called by:*
/Device/HarddiskVolume2/Programmi/Internet Explorer/IEXPLORE.EXE

Test: FOXP & Keylogger

- Advanced KeyLogger 1.3



ZwOpenFile
(
OUT PHANDLE phFile:b4|IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess:100020|
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
ObjectAttributes:/??/C:/WINDOWS/system32/**TMLib.dll**|
OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK pIoStatusBlock:0|IN ULONG ShareMode:5|
IN ULONG OpenMode:60
/Device/HarddiskVolume2/WINDOWS/system32/notepad.exe
)
called by:
/Device/HarddiskVolume2/WINDOWS/system32/notepad.exe

ZwCreateFile
(
PHANDLE FileHandle:dc|ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess:40100080|
POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes:/??/C:/WINDOWS/**ddemal.bin**|
PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock:0|ULONG FileAttributes:80|
ULONG ShareAccess:0|ULONG CreateDisposition:1|ULONG CreateOptions:60|
ULONG EaLength:0
) *called by:*
/Device/HarddiskVolume2/WINDOWS/system32/notepad.exe

FOXP is FOSS

FOXP on SourceForge



Future works

Future Works

- Assessing the **efficiency and efficacy** of the FOXP system with Experimentations;
- **Classifying** the system calls according to their level of **dangerousness** (based on previous experiments);
- **Extending** our System Call Interposition technique on **VISTA** 32-bit OS;
- Communication security with authenticity and non-repudiability of collected logs, is currently under investigation and will be presented in a different paper.

Q&A

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